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Abstract
Service  Oriented  Architecture  (SOA)  is  one  of  the  most 
popular concepts to implement different systems. However it 
faces  many  challenges in terms of  security.  As  a result, a 
number  of  standard  and  frame  works  are  formed  as 
supporters. The main purpose of this survey is to create a
model  for  a  secure  Service-oriented  Architecture  (SOA) 
based on  a formal  model  specified  in the Alloy  modeling 
language. 
The proposed model is based on the basic SOA as well as 
CIA and include secure identities, secure interaction, secure 
publish and secure discover. To validate that our model is 
secure, we created an Alloy model for security. We create 
predicates  that  model  our  security  definitions  and  the 
obstacles which violate these security definitions. Then we 
use each security definition against the obstacle that violates 
it to define secure elements in our model. 
Keywords: SOA, Confidentiality Integrity Availability (CIA), 
authentication, authorization, non-repudiation, alloy
1. Introduction
Though not a novel concept and emerging in 1990s, 
service-oriented architecture (SOA) appears with new 
ability i n  performing  and  realizing  through  related 
equipments  and  protocols.  This  architecture  includes 
an approach to design and implement the distributed 
systems  in  which  system  function  is  utilized  as  a 
service  by  users  and  other  services.  Some  reasons 
appear  in  welcoming  this  architecture  including: 
reducing the production costs, protecting the software
due  to  reusability,  and  possibility  to  facile  system 
development and upgrade. 
On  the  other  hand  one  must  note  that  using  this 
architecture  necessitates  ensuring  the  security 
requirements,  for t he unsafe  technology  results  from 
inefficiency  and  non-operational  function. 
Consequently,  the notion of  security i s  of  particular 
importance  in  this  architecture.  Thus,  despite  the 
advantages of this architecture in terms of the usage, 
efficient security models and frameworks are included 
among  necessary  terms,  not  to  say e nough.  These 
models  also  must  be  checked  in  accuracy.  In  this 
regard, there are numerous methods one of  which is 
formal method.      
This research aims at presenting a service-oriented 
architecture  model  which  regards  the  security 
requirements.  In  this  paper,  we  have  presented  a 
security structure, according to the features of service-
oriented  architecture  and  its  basic  structure,  and 
considering  the  basic  security p rinciples  and  other 
security requirements for service-oriented architecture. 
Then,  making  use  of  Alloy  analyst,  we  studied the 
mentioned structure from the security perspective. 
1.1 Service-oriented Architecture
"Service-oriented architecture", as a term, represents 
a model in which automation logic is broken down into 
smaller separate units of logic which can be distributed 
separately[2] . 
the  basic  structure  of  service-oriented  architecture 
includes  three  elements:  service  provider,  service 
requestor,  and  service  registry,  and  three  standards 
including  web  service  definition  language  (WSDL), 
simple  object  access  protocol  (SOAP)  and  universal 
description discovery and integration (UDDI) makes it 
complete.  
The  illustrated  structure  in Fig.  1 for t he general 
operation  of  service-oriented  architecture,  is  largely 
accepted by references: [2]
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organization, creates and develops services. A service 
provider  defines  the  service  implementing,  service 
description  and  business  support  for a  p articular 
service [5] .
Service requester: The service requester uses service 
and  makes  interactions  to  it.  Service  requester  can 
utilize  service  in  order  to  combine  the  operational 
programs  through  combination  of  available  services. 
This  element  uses  service  registry i n  finding  the 
service  and  is  connected  to  service  directly.  Service 
requester may be an individual or another service [6] .
Service  registry: Service  registry  includes  a set  of 
available  services.  Service  registry s preads  the 
available data in terms of its services in service registry 
in which the service requester can find the data about 
the available services[7] .
WSDL:  it  defines  a  service,  and  this  definition 
conveys a couple of service aspects: service signature 
and data about developing and submitting the details. 
This  data  is  described  by  XML  (extensible  Markup 
Language), a language, apart from platform, for data 
communication [8] .
SOAP:  It  presents  a  definition  that,  according  to 
XML,  can  be  used  for  exchanging  data  among 
existences  in  a  distributed  non-central  context.  This 
signal includes a header and a body [8] .
UDDI: Medium programs that publish and recognize 
web  services  and  include  a  registry  in  which  the 
service  providers  publish their  service  in  order  that 
others can recognize them. This technology arranges 
the  services  and,  after  presenting  a  description, 
allocates the resulting data in a central store [9] .
1.2  Security  and  the S ervice-Oriented 
Architecture
Security r equirements  for a rchitecture  and 
automation  solutions  are  not  novel  in  the  world  of 
information  technology.  Consequently,  service-
oriented operational programs need to be equipped in 
order  to  manage  many  traditional  security 
requirements  for p rotecting  the  data  and  ensuring  of 
authorized data availability. The following includes the 
relation  between  service-oriented  architecture  and 
security principles through CIA triad and WS-security 
framework. 
1.2.1 CIA Triad
In conceptual field, the data security is founded upon 
three primary principles: confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. These security principles make a security 
triad called  CIA  triad.  Fig.2 illustrates  each  one  of 
these  security principles  along  with available 
technologies  in  its  accomplishment  from t he 
service-oriented architecture.  
Service-oriented architecture consists of a set of 
requestors, providers, services and data. 
Confidentiality
By  confidentiality,  in  data  security,  we  mean 
"providing mechanisms for protecting inputs and data 
and private information from unauthorized existences". 
Unauthorized  availability  of  the  private  information 
has  Destructive consequences  not  only i n  national 
security p rograms,  but  also  in  industry  and  trade 
market [10] .
In service-oriented architecture, confidentiality takes 
place through a couple of mechanisms: access control 
and encryption. Access control guarantees that a valid
existence (either a user or an operational program) has 
access  to  an  entity  or a  s ervice.  Encryption  means 
inserting  a  mathematical  algorithm  key  to a  c lear 
context in order to create an unreadable or cipher text 
[3] .
Integrity
Another basic principle of security in service-oriented 
architecture  is  integrity,  which  has  some  definitions 
with the same meaning:
 Integrity i s  a  purpose  during  whose 
accomplishment no data or input can change, 
or if they are clearly authorized to change[11]
.
 Integrity g uarantees  that  the  content  of  the 
signal, from moving from source to delivering 
to  the  recipient  in  the  destination,  has  not 
changed [2] .
In  general,  it  is  perceived  from  integrity t hat  a 
protected  signal  is  regarded  as  a  unified  unit  and  a 
Fig. 1. Basic structure of service orientation [2]
Fig.2. Service oriented architecture and CIA[3]
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completely. 
Integrity i s  discussed  from  two  viewpoints:  data 
integrity and the integrity of origin [11] .
The data integrity guarantees that the data is not under 
risk, and consequently, it is reliable in a period. The 
integrity of origin, on the other hand, guarantees that 
the information about recipient is valid. Both of these 
are implemented through equal encryption which is the 
very digital signature [11]  .
Availability
As  stated  formerly,  data  availability  is  one  of  the 
security p rinciples.  When  authorized  users  cannot 
reach the sources, there is no need for principles such 
as confidentiality and integrity. Thus, availability is of 
the same importance as confidentiality and integrity.
Availability ensures us that the users easily reach to 
the authorized data [10]. In addition to availability as 
an important aspect of reliability, it also guarantees an 
existing source. In terms of security, availability means 
undeniability.  Perhaps,  one  makes  use  of  a  source, 
reaches  the  data  or  call a  service  under  particular 
Conditions; such usages must be undeniable[11] .
1.2.2 WS-security
The WS-security is regarded as the main component 
of service-oriented solutions. Security o perations can 
be  located  on  the  data  exchange  in layered  form  to 
protect  the  data  content  of  the  recipient  [2].  WS-
Security framework and its descriptions providing the 
primary Q OS (Quality o f  service  ) requirements, 
enables the organizations to:
 Use  service-oriented  solutions  for  the 
process  of  the  private  and  particular 
inputs.
 Limit  the  services  availability  if 
necessary.  
As it is illustrated in Fig.3 the WS-Security framework 
uses WS-Policy framework.
1.3 Alloy
Alloy is referred both to a language and a tool; it was 
created  by  Daniel  Jackson  and  the  Software 
Development group in MIT University. This language 
conveys a modeling based on first-order logic used for 
defining  limitations  and  complex  behaviors.[12] The 
idea  of  Alloy  is  to  provide  a  simple  and  partly 
automatic  approach  for s oftware  developers  to  write 
and  test  the  official  features  of  the software  design. 
The Alloy system includes these three elements [12]: 
 Alloy L ogic,  a  combination  of  relative 
algebra and predicate logic, determines the 
combination  method  for t he  relationship 
between  various  primary i nputs  in  Alloy 
and the value of the statement result. 
 Alloy l anguage  used  for expressing  the 
specifications  according  to  Alloy  logic, 
defines the key terms and Alloy structural 
descriptions.  
 Alloy analysis that creates model samples 
to confirm the consistently of a description 
or to violate the assertions. 
Signature
A  signature  represents  set  of  atoms.  Atoms  are  the 
primary e xisting  entities  or t he  very  basic  elements 
having three following specifications:
Indivisible, Immutable, uninterpreted 
1| sig Person {}
Creates a new group called 'Person'; if put key term 
'Abstract'  before  'Person',  it  means  that  the  'Person' 
group  has  no  element  except  those  belonging  to  its 
subdivisions. In order to create limitation in the field of 
atoms in a group, Alloy uses key words such as 'lone', 
'one', 'some', 'no'.  
Alloy Operators
Alloy has some operators of which the most important 
we introduce here: 
1| a + b, a - b, a & b       // union, difference and 
intersection of a and b
2| ~e                               // e transposed
3| ^e                              // transitive closure of e
4 |*e              // reflexive-transitive closure of e
5|a.b               // (relational) join of a and b
6| a -> b                      //product of a and b
7| a in b                     // true if a is a subset of b
Expressions
Alloy logic supports three styles of expression writing 
Fig.3 .Security in service-oriented architecture [2]
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Expression  Style",  and  "Rational  Calculus  Style". 
These styles can be combined if necessary.  
Facts, functions and predicates
There  is  no  high  level  expression  in  Alloy.  Each 
expression is contained in a block, enclosed in braces. 
A fact block holds expressions which form a constraint 
on the model, as they must always hold (example 1, 
lines  16-19). A  predicate  defines  a  reusable  limit 
(example 1, lines 33-35). A function defines a reusable 
expression  (example  1,  lines  28-31).  Predicates  and 
functions can have either no or numerous arguments. 
Functions can return a result. 
A function or predicate which can be applied to a 
single value can always be applied to multiple values 
as  well.For  instance,  Grandpas  function  (example  1, 
lines 28-31) can be applied on one or more 'Person' and 
return their results.  
Modules
Alloy specifications are stored in text files with the file 
extension .als. Each file is called a module and it can 
enter  the  elements  of  a  module  using  the  open 
statement.  If foo.asl includes 
1| sig ThisIsFoo {}
Then bar.asl can use the following signature:
1|  open foo
2|  sig ThisIsBar extends ThisIsFoo {}
If  names  become  ambiguous,  e.g.,  because  bar.als
contains  a  signature  with  the  same name  as  one  in 
foo.als, then the module name can be prepended to the 
signature name.
The module can also be renamed dynamically by using 
the as keyword:
1| open foo as f           // foo is now known as f
2| sig ThisIsFoo {}   // signature with an ambiguous 
name
3| sig ThisIsBar extends f/ThisIsFoo {} 
// extends the imported signature
Imported modules are per default expected in the same 
directory.
Analysis using the Alloy Model Finder
There are two kinds of tests that the analyzer can run. 
For  a  simulation,  the  analyzer  tries  to  find  a model 
which  respects  all  the  constraints  given,  called  an 
“example”. In the checking mode, the analyzer tries to 
find a “counterexample” which violates an assertion. 
For  both  tests,  an  appropriate  command,  run and 
check respectively,  must be  contained  in  the 
specification. It is followed by the name of a predicate 
or assertion which is to be tested and an upper limit for 
the number of  atoms  for e ach signature.  By  default, 
this limit applies to all signatures, but exceptions can 
be defined: The scope for a specific signature may be 
set to a higher or lower value, or the number of atoms 
can  be  set  to  a  fixed  value  by  using  the  exactly 
keyword  (example  1, lines  38  &  41).  If  no  limit  is 
defined for an atom, as default, Alloy will apply the 
test for number 'three'.
To  find  an  example  or  counterexample,  the  Alloy 
Analyzer translates the specification into the input to a 
SAT  solver[13] .  Once  the  solver  has  found  a 
satisfying  assignment,  the  Alloy  software  tool 
visualizes the result. The “Evaluator” window allows 
the live evaluation of expressions in the context of the 
solution.
Example Specification and Analysis
The  following  Alloy  specification  (example  1, 
grandpa.asl)  formalizes  a  simple  example.  It  is  a 
module  header  which  determines  its  name.  The 
complete name of module equals its path and is stored 
in system file. Our example Module is stored in a file 
called 'language/grandpa.asl'. The 'person' group solely 
includes a couple of elements: 'man' and 'woman'. Each 
man can have either no or o ne woman having 'wife' 
relationship to it. Each woman can have either no or 
one man having 'husband' relationship to it.        
A  fact  is  a  limit  to  be  satisfied  all  the  time.  For 
instance,  the  fact  beginning  in  line  16  of  above 
example says that no one can ever be his forebear, and 
if one is a husband of another, the other is his wife, and 
vice versa. 
'No self father' assertion, in this example, says that 
no one can ever be his father, and this is always valid, 
and  no  counter  example  is  found  for i t.  'grandpas' 
function primarily determines that the parents include 
mother,  father  or t heir  spouses,  and  that  the 
grandfather is a man who is the father of the parents. 
The following example illustrates Alloy specifications.
1| module language/grandpa
2|
3| abstract sig Person {
4|     father: lone Man
5| mother: lone Woman
6| }
7|
8| sig Man extends Person {
9| wife: lone Woman
10| } 
11|          
12| sig Woman extends Person {
13| husband: lone Man
14| }
15|
16| fact {
17|       no p: Person | p in p.^(mother+father)
18| wife = ~husband
19| }
20|
21| assert NoSelfFather {
22| no m: Man | m = m.father
23| }
24|
25| // This should not find any counterexample.
26| check NoSelfFather
27|
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28| fun grandpas [p: Person] : set Person {
29| let parent = mother + father +         
father.wife + mother.husband |
30|           p.parent.parent & Man
31| }
32|
33| pred ownGrandpa [p: Person] {
34| p in p.grandpas
35| }
36|
37| // This generates an instance similar to Fig1-3 
38| run ownGrandpa for 4 Person
39|
40| // This generates an instance similar to Fig 2-3
41| run Grandpas  
Instructing the Alloy Analyzer to run all tests on this 
specification  produces  the  following  output  in  the 
command log of the software:
Executing "Check NoSelfFather" :No counterexample 
found. NoSelfFather may be valid.
Executing  "Run  ownGrandpa  for 4  P erson" :
ownGrandpa is consistent.
Executing "Run grandpas": grandpas is consistent
The primary output of Alloy is a directed graph, which 
can be seen in the “instance window” of the analyzer 
software. The atoms, or objects, are shown as nodes, 
while the relations are the edges. The nodes’ shapes 
and colors are chosen arbitrarily and convey no special 
meaning.  If  there  exists  more  than  one  atom  for a  
signature, numbers are assigned to the atoms. Note that 
Alloy does not necessarily produce small or minimal
examples. There may, and almost always will be atoms 
which are not needed to fulfill the constraints.
The  first  command, Check  'No  Self  Father'  is  an 
assertion; as you see Alloy did not find any counter 
example; thus the assertion is valid.  
The second command is Run 'Own Grandpa for 4  
Person' that performs 'own grandpa' for four Person. In 
Fig. 6 one of the created results for this command, the 
result  of  Run  'Own  Grandpa  for 4  P erson',  is 
illustrated.
The last command is Run 'grandpas' that performs 
the  'grandpas'  function.  Fig .4 presents  one  of  the 
results created for this command.
2. Available Models of Service -   Oriented 
Security
We discuss briefly some available models for service-
oriented  architecture  security that  provides  its 
requirements.
IBM:  Reference  Model for  service-Oriented 
Architecture Security
To accomplish the goals and security requirements in 
service-oriented architecture, IBM has also presented a 
logical  architecture  illustrated  in Fig.  5 .This 
architecture  can  be defined  in  three  abstract  levels:
Business  security s ervices,  IT  security  services,  and 
security policy management.  Also, there is a security 
enabler for presenting security functions to IT security 
services[4] . 
NSTISSI: A General Model for Data System Security
CNSS  (Committee  on  National  Security  Systems) 
represents a model for data systems that at the same 
time  functions  as  a  tool  for s ystem  evaluation  and 
development.  The  model  is  unique  in  that  it  stands 
independent of technology[1] .
Fig. 6.The result of executing Run 'owngrandpa for 4
Fig .4. The result of executing Run 'grandpas'
Fig. 5. IBM Model for service-Oriented Architecture Security [4]
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supposed  for  this  model  that  addresses  all  security 
requirements of a data system [1] .
3. The Proposed Security Model
Our  recommended  security  model  is  proposed 
according  to  the  basic  structure  of  service-oriented 
architecture and basic security requirements. We also 
concerned  security  principles  such  as  authorization, 
authentication,  and  non-repudiation.  In  Fig.8 ,  the 
recommended model is illustrated. 
Secure identities: we concern a secure identity for all 
three  available  elements  in  service-oriented 
architecture. Reaching the sources can differ from one 
identity  to  another.  As  an  instance,  discovering  a 
registered service in the service store must be limited 
to  a  particular  recipient.  A  requestor  makes  use  of 
identity  to  reach  his  intended  service.  Both  service 
provider and service requestor may use their identities 
for  encryption  and  registration  of  exchanging 
messages.  In  order  that  a service  is  available  for a n 
identity, primarily, one has to investigate whether the 
presented identity is valid, and then, one has to find 
whether the definite identity is authorized to reach the 
intended service or not. As a result, the two features of 
authorization and authentication must be considered in 
the  field  of  the  identities  in  secure  service-oriented 
architecture. 
Secure interaction: An interaction between the service-
provider and service requestor, to prevent the threats, 
must  be  secure.  In  this  regard,  security  means 
authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity, 
and non-repudiation [14]. In the interaction between a 
service provider and a service requestor, both parties 
must  be  informed  of  each  other's  identities  and 
availability licenses. Thus, in a secure interaction both 
parties must be studied in terms of authentication and 
authorization.  On t he  other  hand,  according  to  the 
security t riad,  the  confidentiality,  integrity a nd 
availability m ust  be  preserved  as  well.  In  security 
issues,  availability  means non-repudiation  [11]. That
includes  two  parts:  sending  non-repudiation  and 
receiving non-repudiation.  
Secure  publish  and  discovery:  Solely  the  authorized 
service provider whose identity is studied can register 
in  service  store.  The  service  requestor  also  must  be 
authenticated before reaching the service store to see 
whether he has the availability license or not. During 
the  service  publish and  discovery, t he  integrity  and 
confidentiality  of  the  store  must  be  protected.  If, 
during  this  connection,  above  requirements  are 
observed, one can ensure that the connection is secure.  
Error! Reference source not found. includes 
observed  security p rinciples  for t he  recommended 
model elements.
Table 1. Elements of security principles in secure service –
oriented architecture
Secure publish
and discovery
Secure 
interaction
Secure 
identity Security Principles
√ √ confidentiality
√ √ integrity
availability
√ √ √ authentication
√ √ √ authorization
√ non-repudiation
4.  Modeling a  Secure  Service-Oriented 
Architecture
Using  Alloy l anguage,  we  created  the  features  of 
intended models which are to be studied as follows. In 
modeling, some definitions of  [15] are used. 
Fig .7.General model for data systems security[1]
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received by an identity, the identity will recognize the 
message and knows that the source was authorized to 
write that message. Generally, for authentication, the 
authority to  write  theory  is  used  for  recognizing  the 
sender. 
Pred authentication () {
all  t:  time  |  all m:Protected_Msg  |  all     
r:Identity |one record: Sent | one c: CanWrite 
|(m->t  in r.knows)  =>  (c.writer  = 
m.lastWriter) &&
(record.sender =c.writer) &&
(c.msg = m) && (record.msg =m) &&  (c->t 
in r.knows)  &&      (record->t in r.knows) 
}
Performing above statement, Fig.10 is formed. 
Authorization: it means, if an identity tends to read or 
write a message, it must be included in the content of 
authorized identities. 
pred authorization(){
       all I: Identity |all c: CanWrite |
        I in c.writer =>
       I in c.msg.protected_by.hasWrite
       all I: Identity | all R: CanRead|
       I in R.Reader =>          
I in R.msg.protected_by.hasRead
}
if an identity is not informed of the message content 
and is not authorized to reach it, it cannot reach it at 
any other time.
The result of above definition is illustrated in Fig.9 and 
Fig.11. According to  Fig.9 'identity  1' is  an identity 
able to read 'canread', for it is authorized by policy to 
read. In Fig.11, 'Identity 1' is an identity that is able to 
write  in  protected  messages  'CanWrite',  for i t  is 
authorized to write by policy.
Fig.8 . proposed model for the security of service-oriented architecture
Fig.10 . the result of Authentication
Fig.9.the result of Authorization (can read)
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the determined readers can reach the message content. 
That is, er time.  
pred Confidentiality(){
all t:  time  - t0/last[]  |  all a:  Identity  |    all
m:Protected_Msg |
let t' = t0/next[t] |
             ((m->t in a.knows) &&(m.contents->
t not in a.knows) &&  
(a  not   i n m.protected_by.hasRead)) =>
(m.contents->t' not in a.knows) 
            }  
The result of performing above definition is illustrated 
in Fig.12.
According  to  Fig.12,  the  components  of 
'Protected_Msg'  are  protected  via  'Policy0',  and  this 
policy cannot reach 'Identity0'. Consequently, although 
in 'time0', 'Identity0' is infirmed of 'Protected_Msg', it 
cannot reach the contents in 'time1'
Integrity:  it  is  understood  from  integrity  that  a 
protected  message  is  regarded  as  a  unity,  and  an 
unauthorized identity cannot make a change in a whole 
or a  p art  of  the  message.  Operationally,  integrity 
means that an attempt in changing a message without 
writing authority destroys the protected message. It is 
studied  in  this  definition  that  there  is  at  least  one 
identity for a protected message that is the source of 
message and is authorized to write.    
pred Integrity(){
  all m :Msg | some p: Identity |
  m in Protected_Msg   => 
(p  in m.protected_by.hasWrite  &&         
m.lastWriter = p )
    }
The  result  of  operating  the  integrity  definition  is 
illustrated  in Fig.13. The  identity  that  writes  on 
'protected_Msg' is the source of message and the 'last 
writer' which was authorized 'hasWrite' to write on it.
Non-repudiation send: it refers to the disability of the 
message source to send the received message. There is 
at least  one  identity  that knows  another identity  has 
sent the message and that is the source of the message.
pred NonRepudiationSenderSide(){
              all t: time | all m: Msg | 
all p,q:   I dentity    | all  record:  Sent  | 
(record.sender = q) &&
              (record.msg = m) &&
(record->t in p.knows) =>
( m.lastWriter = q ) 
}
Fig.11. the result of Authorization (can write)
Fig.13.the result of  integrity
Fig.12. the result of  confidentiality
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repudiation  send  is  illustrated  in  Fig.14 in  which 
'identity0'  knows  what  [sent],  and  knows  that 
'identity1' is the 'lastWriter' and it has sent the message 
(sender). 
Non-repudiation receive: it refers to disability of the 
recipient to receive the sent message. There is at least 
one identity that knows another identity has received 
the message and knows it.
pred NonRepudiationReceiverSide(){
all t:time | all m: Msg | 
all p,q:  Identity| all record:  Recvd  | 
(record.recvr=  q)  &&(record.msg  = m) &&
(record->t in p.knows)  =>
(m->t in q.knows) 
}
The  result  of  non-repudiation  receive  is  shown  in
Fig.16. 'identity0' has received the 'Msg' and 'identity1' 
knows  that  'identity0'  has  received  this  message 
(Knows[received]). 'Identity0' knows 'Msg'. 
5. Evaluating the Proposed Model
To  evaluate  the  proposed  model,  first  we  define  the 
threats of every security requirement; then, according 
to proposed model, we claim that the principles for the 
proposed model are observed. To do this, we operate 
the definitions of security principles along with their 
threats, and obviously it is concluded that it does not 
accord such systems. 
Modeling the Security Threats
Fraud:   t his  threat  invalidates  the  authentication 
requirement.  A  special  identity  sends  a  protected 
message  whose  source  is  another  identity  message. 
Fig.   ١۵ shows  the  created  example in  Alloy.  In this 
figure, 'Identity0' is the sender of a protected message 
that  'Identity1'  is  its  resource.  In  other  words,  an 
identity introduces itself instead of the other, and this
invalidates the authentication requirement.  
  
pred Fraud{
     all t: time | some m: Protected_Msg |
     some r: Sent |    some p: Identity  |
     (r.sender != m.lastWriter) &&
    (r.msg = m) && (m->t in p.knows)  
}
Fig.14.the result of  integrity (send)
Fig.16. the result of  integrity ( receive)
Fig.   ١۵ . Fraud
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authorization  security  requirement.  In  this  case,  the 
identity reads a message without having authority for 
reading  it. It  reads  the  message  content,  or w ith  no 
authority, writes on a protected message.  Fig.18 shows 
the  created  example  in  Alloy  in  which  'Identity0', 
having no authority of 'hasWrite' for writing, has made 
changes on the protected message. This threat rejects 
the authorization requirement.
pred Unauthorized{
     Some s:  CanWrite  |s.writer    not  in  
s.msg.protected_by.hasWrite 
     Some d:  CanRead  |d.Reader    not  in
d.msg.protected_by.hasRead
}
Spy: this threat invalidates the security requirement of 
confidentiality. In this case, some identities are able to 
get informed of message content without an authority 
to read. 
Pred spy(){
some Iden:Identity | some m:Protected_Msg | some
t: (time – t0/last[]) – t0/prev[t0/last[]]    |  let t' = 
t0/next[t]  |    let t''  = t0/next[t']  |    ( Iden  not   i n
m.protected_by.hasRead) &&    
   (m->t in Iden.knows) &&  (m.contents-> 
  t not in Iden.knows) &&  
  (m.contents-> t'' in Iden.knows)  }
Fig.17 illustrates  the  created  example  in  Alloy. 
According  to  Fig.17,  at  'time0'  the  'itdentity1'  is 
informed  of  'protected_Msg';  however,  it  does  not 
know its contents, and is not allowed to reach it. But at 
'time1',  'Identity1'  can  reach  the  contents  of  the 
message.  This  point  invalidates  the  definition  of 
confidentiality.
Distortion:  this  threat  invalidates  the  security 
requirement of integrity. In this case, there are some 
protected messages whose resource, that is, the identity 
written on them last time, has not been authorized to 
write. 
pred distortion(){
some m:  Protected_Msg  |   ( m.lastWriter  not   in    
m.protected_by.hasWrite)
}
Fig.20 illustrates  the  example  created  in  Alloy.  It 
indicates that 'Identity0' is the source of the protected 
message.   W hile  the  message  is  protected  through 
'policy0'  and  according  to  this  policy  'Identity1'  is 
authorized  to  write  on  the  protected  message. 
Accordingly, the definition of integrity is invalidated 
and the intended message is distorted by 'Identity0'. 
Fig.18.unauthorized availability
Fig.17. spy
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requirement  of  non-repudiation.  In  this  case,  an 
identity sends a particular message, while according to 
other identities; it is the source of message of another 
identity.
pred DeniableSending(){
all t:time | one p,q: Identity | one m: Msg |      one r: 
Sent |r.sender = q &&  
r.msg = m && r->t in p.knows  &&   
q != m.lastWriter 
}
Fig.19 illustrates  the  created  example  in  Alloy. 
According to this figure, 'Identity0' sends the protected 
message in a way that others suppose 'Identity1' as the 
source  of  the message;  that  is, 'Identity0'  has  sent a 
denied  sending.  This  definition  invalidates  the 
undeniable sending.
Receive  denial:  this  threat  invalidates  the  security 
requirement  of  undeniable  receive.  In  this  case,  the 
identities  know  that  an  identity  has  received  a 
message; but the recipient identity is not aware of the 
message  content; that is,  the receiver  identity  denies 
receiving the message.  
pred DeniableReception(){
all t:  time  |  one p,q: Identity|  one m: Msg  | one
record: Recvd |record.recvr = q &&    record.msg = 
m  && record->t  in p.knows  && m->t  not  in
q.knows 
}  
Fig.21 shows the created example in Alloy. 'Identity1' 
knows that 'Identity0" has received the message, but 
'Identity0' is not aware of the message; that is, there is 
no  relation  of  'knows'  in  terms of  'Identity0'  to  the 
message.  In  general,  receiving  the  message  by 
'Identity0' is denied.
Fig.19 . sending denial
Fig.21. Receive denial
Fig.20. Distortion
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Up  to  this  point,  the  definition  of  each  security 
principle, along with their threats was presented. Also, 
the created examples in Alloy were illustrated. Now, 
according  to  the  proposed  model,  we  assert that  the 
mentioned  principles  of  the  intended  model  are 
observed.  To  accomplish  this  aim,  we  practice  the 
security p rinciples  definitions  with  their  threats,  and 
then show that this is not a compatible system. 
As stated above, to have a secure identity needs the 
practice  of  authorization  and  authentication  on 
identities.  We  assert  that  an  identity  is  secure;  to 
confirm it, we must show the discordance between the 
definition  of  authentication  and  the  threat  of 
unauthorized availability. For our assertion, we make 
use of the following command:
assert  secureIdentity {
!(authentication[]and  Fraud[])  and   
!(authorization[]and Unauthorized[] )
}
Then,  we  study t he  above  assert  through  this 
command:
  
check secureIdentity
and the result of Alloy analysis will be:
Executing "Check secureIdentity":No counterexample 
found. Assertion may be valid”
It concludes the accuracy of our asserion, and that the 
identity is secure through given specification. 
For a secure interaction between service provider and 
service  requestor,  we  had  to  observe  authentication, 
authorization,  integrity,  confidentiality,  and  non-
repudiation. According to the mentioned definitions for 
these principles and their threats, we use the following 
code for a secure interaction: 
  
assert secureinteract {
    !(authentication[]and Fraud[]) and 
    !(authorization[] and Unauthorized[]) and
     !(Confidentiality[] and spy[]) and 
     !(Integrity[] and distortion[]) and
    !(NonRepudiationReceiverSide[] and 
     DeniableReception[]) and  
    !(NonRepudiationSenderSide[] and
    DeniableSending[])
}
Then,  we  study t he  above  assert  through  this 
command:
check secureinteract
and the result of Alloy analysis will be:
Executing " check secureinteract":No counterexample 
found. Assertion may be valid
This conclusion proves our assertion as correct and the 
identity is secure through given specification. 
To have a secure publish between service provider and 
the  service  registry,  and  also  to  have  a  secure 
discovery  between  the  service  requestor  and  the 
service registry, we had to practice the authentication, 
authorization, confidentiality, and integrity. According 
to the definitions of the principles and their threats, to 
have a secure publish and discovery, we make use of 
the following commands: 
assert securepublish {
!(authentication[]and Fraud[])and 
!(authorization[] and Unauthorized[]) and
!(Confidentiality[] and spy[]) and 
!(Integrity[] and distortion[])     
}
assert securediscover {
!(authentication[]and Fraud[])and 
!(authorization[] and Unauthorized[]) 
!(Confidentiality[] and spy[]) and 
!(Integrity[] and distortion[]) 
}
Then,  we  study  the  above  assertion through  these 
commands:
check securepublish
check securediscover
The following is the conclusion of Alloy analysis, and 
our  assertion is  correct  and  the  identity  is  secure 
through given specification.
Executing " check securepublish":No counterexample 
found. Assertion may be valid
Executing" check securediscover":No counterexample 
found. Assertion may be valid
6. Conclusion
In  this  article,  first  we  studied  the  features  and  the 
basic  structure  of  service-oriented  architecture;  then 
we investigated the subject and the importance of the 
security and described a couple  of models presented 
for this architecture. In accordance with using Alloy as 
a  tool  for  evaluating  the  particular  model,  in  this 
article, we described the specification of this tool and 
language  through  an  example.  Using  the  mentioned 
notions  in  terms  of  service-oriented  architecture  and 
security,  and  based  on  basic  structure  and  security 
principles  of  this  model  and  some  other  security 
requirements,  a  security  model  was  presented  for 
service-oriented  architecture.  A  secure  identity  was 
regarded  for t he  three  existing  elements  in  this 
architecture; the authorization and authentication must 
be applied on this secure identity. In suggested model, 
a  necessity o f  the  secure  relation  between  service 
provider and service  requestor  was  asserted; and  we 
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authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity 
and non-repudiation are  concerned.  In  order  that  the 
service provider can publish his service data in service 
registry, authentication, authorization,  confidentiality, 
integrity must be preserved in this relationship. Also, 
for reaching the service requestor to the particular date 
through  service  registry,  the  authentication, 
authorization, confidentiality, integrity principles must 
be concerned in their relation.  
After  presenting  a  security m odel  including  the 
determined specification, the model must be validated. 
We  did  this  through  Alloy:  first,  we  defined  the 
security p rinciples  in  Alloy  and  operated  them  to 
ensure the definitions are compatible. Then, we studied 
the security threats against these principles, and made 
them models to ensure that they are prototype-able in a 
non-secure model. Finally, to verify the security of the 
model, we operated each security definition against the 
threat  violate it,  and  we  got sure  that  these  security 
definitions do not accord their threats in our model. As 
a result, our proposed model is secure.          
References
[1] McConnell, J. (1994). National Training Standard 
for  Information  Systems  Security ( INFOSEC) 
Professionals, DTIC Document.
[2] Erl,  T.  (2005).  Service-oriented  architecture 
(SOA):  concepts,  technology,  and  design, 
Prentice Hall Englewood Cliffs.
[3] Tipnis, A.,  Lomelli, I.(2009).Security: A Major 
Imperative for a Service-Oriented Architecture –
HP  SOA  Security M odel  and  Security 
Assessment, HP Viewpoint Paper.
[4] Buecker,  A.,  P.  Ashley,  et  al.  (2008). 
Understanding  SOA  Security  Design  and 
Implementation, IBM Redbooks.
[5] Papazoglou,  M.  P.  (2003).  Service-oriented 
computing:  Concepts,  characteristics  and 
directions.  Web  Information  Systems 
Engineering,  2003.  WISE  2003.  Proceedings  of 
the Fourth International Conference on, IEEE.
[6] Rahaman,  M.  A.,  A.  Schaad,  et  al.  (2006). 
Towards  secure  SOAP  message  exchange  in  a 
SOA. Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on 
Secure web services, ACM
[7] Papazoglou,  M.  P.  and  W.-J.  Van  Den  Heuvel 
(2007).  "Service  oriented  architectures: 
approaches,  technologies  and  research  issues." 
The VLDB journal 16(3): 389-415
[8] Haas,  H.  and  A.  Brown ( 2004).  "Web  services 
glossary."  W3C  Working  Group  Note  (11 
February 2004).
[9] Newcomer,  E.  (2002).  Understanding  Web 
Services:  XML,  Wsdl,  Soap,  and  UDDI, 
Addison-Wesley Professional.
[10] Danielyan, J. C. E. (2005). Sun Certified Security 
Administrator for Solaris, Dreamtech Press.
[11] Hafner,  M.  and  R.  Breu  (2009).  Security 
engineering  for s ervice-oriented  architectures, 
Springer.
[12] Jackson, D.(2006). Software Abstractions Logic, 
Language, and Analysis., MIT press.
[13] Jackson, D. (2002). "Alloy: a lightweight object 
modelling  notation."  ACM  Transactions  on 
Software  Engineering  and  Methodology 
(TOSEM) 11(2): 256-290.
[14] Nezhad,  H.  R.  M.,  H.  Skogsrud,  et  al.  (2005). 
"Securing Service-Based Interactions: Issues and 
Directions." IEEE Distributed Systems Online.
[15] Grisham,  P.  S.,  C.  L.  Chen,  et  al.  (2006). 
Validation  of  a  Security M odel  with  the  Alloy 
Analyzer, October.
ACSIJ Advances in Computer Science: an International Journal, Vol. 3, Issue 4, No.10 , July 2014
ISSN : 2322-5157
www.ACSIJ.org
36
Copyright (c) 2014 Advances in Computer Science: an International Journal. All Rights Reserved.